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This paper investigates the role of inﬂation and output uncertainties on monetary policy rules in Turkey
for the period 2002:01e2014:02. In the literature it is suggested that uncertainty is a key element in
monetary policy, hence empirical models of monetary policy should regard to uncertainty. In this study,
we estimate a forward-looking monetary reaction function of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey
(CBRT). In addition to inﬂation and output gap variables, our reaction function also includes both the
inﬂation and output growth uncertainties. Our results suggest that the Central Bank of the Republic of
Turkey (CBRT) concerns with mainly price stability and signiﬁcantly responds to inﬂation and growth
uncertainties.
© 2016 Central Bank of The Republic of Turkey. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open
access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The Taylor rule indicates that, the central bank should adjust the
nominal interest rate in response to deviations of inﬂation from
target and output from potential. According to this rule, the central
bank raises the interest rates in response to inﬂation. On the other
hand, it reduces interest rates to stimulate output. While the Taylor
rule provides a simple and clear rule for monetary policy and ex-
plains monetary policy behaviour in many countries, this rule has
some disadvantages. One of these disadvantages is that according
to Taylor rule, central bank responds only to the inﬂation rate and
the output gap. However, central banks may respond to other
variables such as exchange rate, asset prices, monetary aggregates
and so on to achieve price stability. In more open economies, for
example, beside output gap and inﬂation, exchange rate is also
important to describe the state of the economy. The other disad-
vantage is that the changes in the structure of the economy may
lead to a change in the coefﬁcients of optimal policy rule (Peersman
and Smets, 1999). In the literature, there is not any consensus about
what the efﬁcient Taylor rule parameters should be. Taylor (1993)
proposed a parameter of 1.5 on inﬂation and 0.5 on the output
gap to explain the Fed's behaviour. While Clarida et al., (1999)03.
nk of the Republic of Turkey.
urkey. Production and hosting byestimate similar parameters for some countries other than US,
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) ﬁnd larger optimal parameters for
US. Ball (1997) also argues that an efﬁcient parameter on the output
gap should be larger than Taylor (1993)’s estimate. Brainard (1967)
provides an explanation for this distinction between actual central
bank behaviour and the optimal parameters which is suggested by
these studies. He argues that uncertainty about the effects of policy
on economy makes policymakers more conservative.
Uncertainties make conduct of monetary policy more compli-
cated. Due to the measurement difﬁculties, policymakers cannot
observe the current values of the inﬂation and output gap accu-
rately when they set the interest rate. Therefore, they should pre-
dict them from the inﬂation and output gap data. Some studies
examine how monetary policy should be conducted under data
uncertainty. For example, Aoki (2003) states that if data uncertainty
in one variable increases, the policy maker should respond less to
the movements in that variable. In addition, Smets (2002),
Peersman and Smets (1999), Rudebusch (2001) show that data
uncertainty (particularly about the output gap) reduces the optimal
coefﬁcient on the output gap in a Taylor rule. Some other studies
discuss the effects of inﬂation uncertainty on interest rates. How-
ever, these studies do not provide deﬁnite evidence about the ef-
fects of inﬂation uncertainty on nominal interest rates in both
theoretical and empirical literature. Juster and Wachtel (1972a, b)
and Juster and Taylor (1975) state that if inﬂation variability and
nominal income do not move one for one, the variance ofElsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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protect themselves against inﬂation will increase savings. As a
result, according to loanable funds theory, interest rates decline.
This implies a negative relationship between inﬂation uncertainty
and interest rates. Some arguments such as market frictions and a
positive relationship between inﬂation uncertainty and real rates
may also give rise to a negative relationship between inﬂation
uncertainty and nominal interest rates (e.g. Jorda and Salyer, 2003;
Frankel and Lown, 1994). On the other hand, portfolio theory sug-
gests a positive relationship (e.g. Markowitz, 1952). Namely, the
variance of the rate of return is taken as a risk measure. Since
inﬂation uncertainty increase the rate of return variability, risk-
averse agents require (desire) higher yields. Asset pricing model,
the Fisher hypothesis and the term structure theory also suggest a
positive relationship between inﬂation uncertainty and nominal
interest rates (e.g. Cox et al., 1981; Fama, 1975; Chan, 1994). Simi-
larly, while some empirical studies such as Fama and Gibbons
(1982), Mishkin (1992) and Berument (1999) ﬁnd a positive rela-
tionship between inﬂation uncertainty and interest rates, some
other studies such as Stulz (1986), Jorda and Salyer (2003),
Berument et al. (2005) and Omay and Hasanov (2010) ﬁnd a
negative relationship.
These arguments suggest that uncertainty is a key element in
monetary policy, hence empirical models of monetary policy
should regard to uncertainty. In this study, we have estimated the
monetary reaction function of the CBRT. Apart from the previous
studies for Turkey, we consider the reaction of the CBRT to un-
certainties. Some studies (see Berument and Malatyalı (2000),
Berument and Tasci (2004), Omay and Hasanov (2006), Gozgor
(2012)) estimated the different speciﬁcations of the monetary
policy rules for CBRT. However, none of these studies have con-
cerned with the effect of uncertainty on monetary policy rule.
Therefore, to ﬁll this gap, we investigate whether the monetary
policy responds to both inﬂation and output uncertainties by
changing the interest rate in the case of Turkey. Additionally, pre-
vious studies generally investigate the affect of the uncertainty in
the output and inﬂation on the coefﬁcients of the optimal monetary
policy rule. In this study, we focus directly on the parameters of
output and inﬂation uncertainties. These uncertainties are included
into the Taylor e type monetary policy rule. We apply Generalized
Methods of Moments (GMM) for estimating monetary policy re-
action function. Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of inﬂation and output
uncertainties suggest that the monetary authority takes these un-
certainties into consideration while forming the interest rate rule.
On the other hand, insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients indicate that un-
certainties have no explanatory power for the interest rate de-
cisions. The results show that the CBRT concerns mainly with price
stability after the adoption of the inﬂation targeting. We also
conclude that the CBRT considers the inﬂation and output un-
certainties in setting the policy rate.
Another contribution of our study is to include an indicator of
global ﬁnancial liquidity conditions in our reaction function sepa-
rately. The experience of the global crisis indicates the importance
of ﬁnancial stability especially for emerging market economies.
Capital ﬂows towards Turkey like other emerging markets
increased as a result of the expansionary monetary policies of
advanced economies in the post-global crisis period. This surge in
capital inﬂows supported domestic credit growth and caused
appreciation of Turkish Lira. As a consequence of these de-
velopments, the current account deﬁcit widened. Since the current
account ﬁnance mainly depends on the short-term capital move-
ments, the concerns about ﬁnancial stability increased (Bas¸çı and
Kara, 2011). Therefore, since 2010, the CBRT has been implement-
ing a new monetary policy concerning both ﬁnancial stability and
price stability.In the traditional inﬂation targeting framework, ﬁnancial sta-
bility is not separately included in the objective function and the
central bank reacts to variables related with ﬁnancial stability only
indirectly through their impact on inﬂation (Kara, 2012). However,
since late 2010, the CBRT has been explicitly concerned with
ﬁnancial stability. Since CBRT's reaction function could be affected
from this policy shift, we extended our model. To capture the policy
stance of advanced countries, we include the change in the ten-year
treasury rate of the US Treasury as one of the explanatory variables.
Our results show that the CBRT signiﬁcantly responses to US trea-
sury rate.
The next section introduces the literature. The third section
summarizes the monetary policy of the CBRT. The forth section
reports empirical model, data and empirical results. The ﬁnal sec-
tion concludes the paper.
2. Literature
Many studies investigate the effects of uncertainties on the co-
efﬁcients in the Taylor rule. Bihan and Sahuc (2002) show that
when parameter uncertainty is taken into account, inﬂation and
output gap parameters decline in the optimal reaction function.
Smets (1998) argues that output gap uncertainty affects the
parameter in the monetary policy rule. He shows that higher un-
certainty leads to a fall reaction coefﬁcient on the output gap in
simple Taylor rules for the US economy. Peersman and Smets
(1999) show that estimation error in the output gap causes the
weight of output gap in a Taylor rule to fall for EU5. The amount of
this decline in this coefﬁcient depends on the weights in the
objective function. Similarly, Swanson (2004) shows that when one
variable is more uncertain, the weight on the other variable may be
larger. Orphanides (2003) emphasizes that the ignorance of the
measurement errors of the data causes misleading decisions about
the performance of the activist policies. They suggest less activist
policies to provide economic stability when the noise in the data is
taken into account. Ehrmann and Smets (2003) show that the
performance of the Taylor rule is not affected by output gap un-
certainty. Uncertainty about the output gap causes reaction coef-
ﬁcient on the output gap to fall only marginally. Martin and Milas
(2009) ﬁnd that when inﬂation and output gap are more certain,
the weights of these variables are lower. The other ﬁnding is that
when one variable is more uncertain, the weight of the other var-
iable is larger.
Another line of the literature investigates the effects of inﬂation
uncertainty on interest rate within the Fisher hypothesis frame-
work. Berument et al. (2005) show that inﬂation uncertainty is
important to explain interest rate for UK. Similarly, Berument
(1999) suggests that expected inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty
have positive effect on interest rate for UK. Yuksel and Akdi (2009)
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of inﬂation risk on interest rate for US. Omay
and Hasanov (2010) suggest a negative relationship between
inﬂation uncertainty and the interest rate for US. They also show
that this relationship is regime dependent and it is greater in low-
inﬂationary periods.
Some studies discuss why the central bank should respond to
uncertainties. Mishkin (2000) and Goodfriend (2007) provide some
principles for central banks to avoid the creation of uncertainties.
Montes (2010, p.95) states that “in modern economies, expecta-
tions play a decisive role as a transmission mechanism of monetary
policies.” Since monetary policy affects the economic performance
through expectations in the inﬂation targeting regime, almost all
inﬂation targeting central banks are concerned with the mainte-
nance of credibility. Therefore, it is conceivable that the central
banks respond to uncertainty shocks in order to improve the
effectiveness of monetary policy.
1 When the measure of uncertainties are changed, for example when we use a
GARCH model to measure inﬂation and output uncertainties, we found insigniﬁcant
coefﬁcients. This issue desires further exploration in future research.
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policy in emerging markets and contain important ﬁndings. Taylor
(2002) shows that the use of monetary policy rules in emerging
economies has some beneﬁts. He states that monetary policy rules
increase the anticipation effects of monetary policy. Corbo (2002)
ﬁnds that Latin American central banks set their interest rates
according to inﬂation and other objectives. Monetary Authority of
Singapore (2000) estimates a forward-looking interest rate reac-
tion function for East Asia economies. Their results indicate that
the authorities place greater weight on inﬂation since the cur-
rency crisis and are more willing to raise interest rates according
to inﬂation expectations. Mohanty and Klau (2004) state that most
central banks in emerging countries change interest rates in
response to inﬂation and exchange rate shocks. Minella et al.
(2002) estimate a Taylor-type reaction function for Brazil and
show that the Central Bank reacts strongly to inﬂation expecta-
tions. Ncube and Tshuma (2010) suggests that nonlinear Taylor
rule holds for South African Bank.
A number of studies have estimated the monetary policy re-
action function for Turkey. However, none of these studies have
analysed the role of uncertainties in the monetary policy rule.
Berument and Malatyalı (2000) state that the CBRT concerns the
lagged inﬂation rate rather than the future rate and implement
output-targeting policy during the period 1989:07e1997:03.
Berument and Tas¸çı (2004) conclude that the CBRT deals with the
output stability instead of inﬂation in the period from 1990:01 to
2000:10. Omay and Hasanov (2006) state that backward-looking
models explain the CBRT's reaction function for the period of
1990:01e2003:12. They ﬁnd that while the aim of expansionary
monetary policy is to stabilise output, contractionary policies
aimed at reducing the inﬂation rate. Yazgan and Yilmazkuday
(2007) report that a forward-looking Taylor rule can describe
the CBRT's behaviour for the period of 2001:08e2004:04. G€ozg€or
(2012) ﬁnd that the reaction function of the CBRT can be explained
by Taylor rule speciﬁcation in inﬂation targeting.
3. The monetary policy of the CBRT
The Turkish economy has experienced high and volatile inﬂa-
tion during the 1990's and the beginning of 2000's. The inﬂation
rate reached its highest level 107.3% in 1994 and its lowest level
6.16% in 2012. Turkey has undergone two economic crises during
this period, in 1994 and in 2001. The Turkish economy declined by
6.1% in 1994 and by 5.7% in 2001. Additionally, the global ﬁnancial
crisis causes GDP to decline by 4.8% in 2009.
Turkey has implemented several stabilization programs to keep
inﬂation under control. In 1999 an exchange rate based stabilisation
programme under support of IMF was adopted. However, this pro-
gramme was abandoned in February 2001 in the face of speculative
attacks. The Turkish economy experienced its severest economic
crisis in 2001. The law on the Turkish Central Bank was amended in
April 2001, and the central bank was reinforced instrument inde-
pendence. The primary objective of the bank was stipulated as
ensuring price stability. Turkey adopted implicit inﬂation targeting
from January 2002 to December 2005. During this period the
necessary pre-conditions to implement anexplicit inﬂation targeting
regimewere tried to be satisﬁed. Some reforms such as restructuring
of the banking system, ﬁscal reforms, and structural reforms were
realized. The explicit inﬂation targeting regime started to be imple-
mented in January 2006. The CBRT used the short-term interest rate
as a primary instrument to implement its disinﬂation policy.
The experience of the recent global economic developments
shows the importance of the ﬁnancial stability. Therefore, since
2010, the CBRT has been implementing a new monetary policy
concerning both ﬁnancial stability and price stability. The newpolicy tools like interest rate corridor, liquidity policies and required
reserves have been adopted to achieve these objectives (CBRT, 2011).4. Empirical model, data and empirical results
Following Clarida et al., (1999) we use a forward-looking version
of the Taylor rule. Then, we use ‘Enriched Taylor-Type’ rule (e.g.
Berument et al., 2005) where inﬂation and growth uncertainty is
added toTaylor rule. It is widely accepted that because of the ofﬁcial
dislike of ﬁnancial instability, monetary authorities adjust interest
rates gradually (see, e.g. Clarida et al., (1999); Ozlale, 2003).
Therefore we allow for interest rate smoothing by including two
lags of interest rate in the monetary policy rule. We included two
lags of interest rate, which was sufﬁcient to overcome the residual
autocorrelation.
The model is as follows:
it ¼ u0 þ u1it1 þ u2it2 þ u3ptþ12 þ u4gaptþ12 þ u5uncpt
þ u6uncgt
(1)
Where it is the nominal interest rate, u0 is the intercept term. pt is
the inﬂation gap (inﬂation minus inﬂation target), gaptis the output
gap, which is calculated by detrending the index of industrial
production using the Hodrick Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. In HP ﬁlter we
specify smoothing parameter as 14 400, which is appropriate for
monthly data. We used seasonally adjusted industrial production
series. uncpt is the end of year inﬂation uncertainty and uncgt is the
end of year growth uncertainty. u5 and u6are coefﬁcients for the
inﬂation and output growth uncertainty, respectively.4.1. Data and empirical results
We use monthly Turkish data from 2002:01 to 2014:02. The data
are gathered from International Monetary Fund-International
Financial Statistics. The inﬂation series is the annual percent
change in CPI. Targeted inﬂation rates are obtained from CBRT. In-
terest rate is the weighted average of overnight interbank interest
rate,which is used asapolicy instrumentby theCBRT. Theoutput gap
isobtainedbydetrending the indexof industrialproductionusing the
Hodrick Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. Uncertainties in inﬂation and growth
data are obtained from the CBRT's survey of expectations. Inﬂation
uncertainty is the series of the standard deviationof expected annual
end-yearCPI-based inﬂationrate. Similarly, growthuncertainty is the
series of the standard deviation of expected GDP growth rate.1
Figs. 1 and 2 plot graphs of inﬂation rate and interest rate,
respectively. As can be seen from the ﬁgures, inﬂation rate and
interest rate had been volatile and high before the 2002. Since 2002
both series have become more stable.
We ﬁrst test for stationarity of the series using conventional ADF
test. The results of the ADF test are presented in Table 1. The results
suggest that the series are stationary.
We estimate the Taylor rule using the linear Generalised Method
of Moments (GMM). This method is used to avoid a possible cor-
relation between dependent variables and the residuals. We choose
the instrument variables regarding two criteria. First, the instru-
ment set should be included in the central bank's information set
which it uses to determine interest rate at time t. Second, the in-
struments should be correlated with the dependent variables.
Fig. 1. Inﬂation rate.
Fig. 2. Interest rate.
Table 1
ADF unit root test results.
i 3.193 (0.09)
p 6.954 (0.000)
gap 3.812 (0.000)
uncpt 4.123 (0.000)
uncgt 3.567 (0.008)
P-values are reported in parentheses.
Table 2
Estimates of the monetary policy reaction function: 2002:01e2014:02.
Constant 0.018 (0.828) 0.039 (0.806)
it1 1.453* (0.000) 1.600* (0.000)
it2 0.471* (0.000) 0.602* (0.000)
ptþ1 0.045* (0.000) 0.008 (0.280)
gaptþ12 0.001 (0.788) 0.0002 (0.889)
uncpt 0.157* (0.000) 0.073 (0.205)
uncgt 0.199** (0.014) 0.202* (0.000)
iusa 0.036 (0.377)
dummy 4.232* (0.000)
it1dummy 0.134** (0.006)
it2dummy 0.330* (0.000)
ptþ12dummy 0.012 (0.661)
gaptþ12dummy 0.010 (0.105)
uncptdummy 1.130* (0.000)
uncgtdummy 1.191* (0.000)
usdummy 1.666* (0.000)
Jtest 0.11 0.16
Notes: The instrument set includes lagged values up to 6 lags and 9 lags of inﬂation,
the output gap, nominal exchange rate and money growth in the ﬁrst column and in
the second column, respectively. P-values are reported in parentheses *, **, and ***
denotes signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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horizon of 12 for monthly estimate of the Taylor rule for Turkey. The
instrument set used in the model includes lagged values of the
output gap and the inﬂation rate. Additional instruments include
the lagged values of annual changes of nominal exchange rate and
annual M1 growth that help forecast inﬂation and output. We use
the Hansen's J-test to test the validity of over identifying restrictions.
The evidence from Table 2 shows that while the coefﬁcients for
the expected inﬂation are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, the
coefﬁcients for the output gap in both speciﬁcations are statistically
insigniﬁcant. This implies that the CBRT mainly targeted price
stability after the adoption of the inﬂation targeting. The results
also show that the CBRT considers the inﬂation and output un-
certainties in setting the policy rate. The coefﬁcient of inﬂation
uncertainty is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. That is, the CBRT
targeted inﬂation uncertainty in addition to inﬂation targeting. This
result may imply that the CBRT presumes a positive link between
inﬂation and inﬂation uncertainty as suggested by Okun (1971) and
Friedman (1977). The high inﬂation experience of Turkish economy
for more than twenty years provides supporting evidence to this
expectation. Inﬂationary process makes public's expectations about
future inﬂation more persistent. Since the CBRT expects that in-
creases in inﬂation expectation leads to an increase inﬂation rates,
the monetary policy becomes responsive to inﬂation expectations.
The results also show that the coefﬁcient of growth uncertainty is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant. This implies that although the
monetary policy authorities do not target the output, they concern
growth uncertainty. The CBRT reduces the interest rates in response
to increased growth uncertainty to stimulate output. In other word,
the CBRT tries to smooth ﬂuctuations in output.In addition, to see the effect of the CBRT's modiﬁcation of its
inﬂation targeting framework at the end of 2010 on the CBRT's
reaction function, we extended our model. We include the ten-year
treasury rate of the U.S. Treasury as one of the explanatory vari-
ables. This variable would be useful to capture the policy stance of
advanced countries. In addition, we include a dummy variable to
see whether there has been a shift in all the reaction parameters
since November 2010. The dummy variable is interacted with all
the parameters. The results are presented in the second column of
Table 2. We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients of inﬂation, output gap,
inﬂation uncertainty and treasury rate of the U.S. are insigniﬁcant
before November 2010. The results show that the CBRT reduced the
interest rate in response to an increase in growth uncertainty
during this period. On the other hand, we see that the CBRT has
responsed to treasury rate of the U.S., inﬂation uncertainty and
growth uncertainty after November 2010. These results imply that
since the adoption of unconventional monetary policy at the end of
2010, the CBRT has responsed the global liquidity conditions. The
parameters of the reaction function also imply that the monetary
policy has become more responsive to growth uncertainty since
November 2010.
The results show that using a dummy variable changes the co-
efﬁcients of the Taylor rule. This might be due to several factors.
First, when the sample is divided into two sub-periods, there might
be a short-sample problem, especially in the later sub-period.
Second, a simple Taylor rule may not be suitable to represent the
reaction of the monetary policy since the global ﬁnancial crisis.
After the global ﬁnancial crisis many central banks around the
world have started to caremore about ﬁnancial stability. Hence, the
Taylor rule might need to be modiﬁed to incorporate the ﬁnancial
stability objective.
Overall, our results indicate that the CBRT concerns the market
perception. It is important for credibility of monetary policy un-
der inﬂation targeting. In addition to credibility, the main
essential characteristics of inﬂation targeting are an explicit
inﬂation target, ability to conduct an independent monetary
policy from ﬁscal policy and a high degree of transparency and
accountability. The central bank must announce targets and
policy plans to the public and explain the reasons of policy
changes. Our results suggest that when uncertainties rise the
CBRT responds immediately to restrict these changes. That is, if
there is an uncertainty in inﬂation, the monetary authorities in-
crease the interest rate. However, if growth uncertainty increases
they reduce the interest rate.
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Central banks face a number of uncertainties, thus uncertainty
is a key element in monetary policy. The effects of uncertainties
on the monetary policy have been discussed in both theoretical
and empirical literature. Some studies investigate the effects of
uncertainties on the coefﬁcients in the Taylor rule. Another line of
the literature investigates the effects of inﬂation uncertainty
within the Fisher hypothesis framework. These studies emphasize
that the ignorance of the uncertainties may cause misleading
decisions. Although the monetary policy rule for the CBRT has
been investigated in the literature, the response of the CBRT to
uncertainties is not discussed. In this study, we assess the role of
inﬂation and output uncertainties in policy formulation of the
CBRT. These uncertainties are included into the Taylor etype
monetary policy rule.
We apply Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) for esti-
mating monetary policy reaction function. The results indicate that
the CBRT concerns mainly with price stability after the adoption of
the inﬂation targeting programme. We also conclude that the CBRT
considers inﬂation and output growth uncertainties in setting the
policy rate. This indicates that monetary authorities consider eco-
nomic stability to achieve their objectives. The CBRT tends to apply
tight monetary policy to reduce both inﬂation and inﬂation un-
certainty. This implies that inﬂation uncertainty causes a decline in
output further through interest rate channel. According to our es-
timates, the coefﬁcient of the output growth uncertainty is negative
and statistically signiﬁcant. While monetary policy authorities do
not target the output, they want to smooth ﬂuctuations in output.
The CBRT reduces the interest rate to decline growth uncertainties.
When we consider the policy shift of the CBRT, we conclude that
the monetary authority signiﬁcantly responses the policy stance of
the advanced countries.
We observe that using a dummy variable changes the co-
efﬁcients of the Taylor rule. This change might be due to several
factors: When the sample is divided into two sub-periods, there
might be a short-sample problem. In addition, after the global
ﬁnancial crisis, the Taylor rule might need to be modiﬁed to
incorporate the ﬁnancial stability objective. This issue deserves
further attention in future research.
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